China's Antarctic Intentions, part 1

One problem with international law is that it can be difficult to enforce.

In my last couple of posts [Case Study #1: Antarctica and The Mining Ban in Antarctica] I've been discussing international regulations concerning Antarctic development and resource extraction. The aim of these posts was to set the stage for the editorial you're about to read, concerning a Chinese official's recent comments about his government's interest in the potential of Antarctic mineral resources.

Basically, it goes like this: over the last few decades, a bunch of representatives from various national governments got together and agreed that Antarctica is a Global Commons [i.e. a global public space belonging to no one and everyone], that its natural environment should be protected, and that any activity pertaining to mining would be prohibited for a minimum of 50 years [2041].

Cool, sounds good.

However, this raises the following question: suppose one government [or corporation, or individual, for that matter] decided to go ahead and exploit Antarctica's natural resources anyway - possibly to the detriment of the continent's natural eco-system, not to mention the rare precedence for international environmental legislation. Who, exactly, would have the power to stop them?

At a recent meeting between Chinese dignitaries and Australian diplomats that took place at Australia's Antarctic Casey Base, Mr Qu Tanzhou, director of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration, made a public statement about China's interest in the potential of Antarctic resources and Chinese intentions to investigate how these resources might be used. China's Minister for Land and Resources Mr Xu Shaoshi, who was also in attendance, further underscored his government's interest in the continent's vast store of mineral riches.

Legally, I suppose there are repercussions for violating an international treaty - a proverbial slap on the wrist or a bad public relations campaign or economic sanctions, if the stakes were high enough [which, let's face it, they're not in the case of Antarctica.]

But really, if China wants to mine Antarctica - even though it violates the standing international agreement - there's not that much anyone can do about it. In fact, there's a good chance no one would even know about it. I mean, Antarctica's a big place with a pretty darn low population density.

Admittedly, this isn't the first example of a national government placing its own self-interest ahead of the Antarctic Treaty System. When the US began construction of the "Ice Highway" - from The Amundsen-Scott facility at the South Pole to the headquarters of American Antarctic activity at McMurdo Station - they incurred considerable criticism from other Consultative Party representatives who were concerned about the negative environmental impact of the project. The Ice Highway can be read as evidence of a disconnect between de jure Antarctic regulations and de facto proceedings - the 1991 Environmental Protocol works really well; that is, until it doesn't.

Yet somehow I still think there's a big difference - in scale, but also of attitude - between the US building a highway and China declaring its intentions to mine in Antarctica. When the US Antarctic Program [and Raytheon's Polar Division] began construction of the Ice Highway, members of the US delegation to Antarctica made it apparent that they knew they were pissing off other governments. There was a strong effort made to appease the press and the public, paying lip service to the environmental question by extolling the project's benefits to global science initiatives [it would ease transportation, cooperation, and the collection of ice core samples, etc.].

I don't mean to let the US off the hook here; it still went against the recommendations of the other Consultative nations, in essence violating the international agreement, but it seems to me the Chinese government's attitude is markedly different; they're not even pretending to acknowledge the rhetorical game of global environmental politics.